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A prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest . . . is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer."'
Despite these noble words, legislative and prosecutorial efforts to ensure that
"guilt shall not escape" have produced sundry unconstitutional devices for
* J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991.
1. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), quoted in OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGE-
MENT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LEGAL ACTIVTIES 1990-1991,
at ii (1990).
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convicting criminal defendants. 2 The latest such device is "certification," which
allows a prosecutor to determine an element of a crime, and insulates the
determination from judicial review. This paper argues that prosecutorial certifi-
cation violates the constitutional rights to due process
3 and a jury trial. 4
The paper focuses on certification as it appears in a federal antiterrorist
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2331,1 "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Terrorist Acts
Abroad Against United States Nationals.''6 The statute prohibits murder, at-
tempted murder, and serious assaults against American nationals committed
outside the United States, regardless of the nationality of the attacker. 7 However,
2. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (striking down state statute authorizing
conviction based on a preponderance of the evidence); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969)
(striking down unfair or suggestive lineup procedures); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(striking down discriminatory application of state statute); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879 Term) (striking down state statute excluding blacks from juries); Irene Merker Rosenberg,
Winship Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEx. L. REv. 109, 110-11 (1990) (describing conditions and legal
standards prevailing in New York Family Courts in 1967).
3. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. The statute has a colorful legislative history. It was originally incorporated into the United
States Code as 18 U.S.C. § 2331, Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-399, § 1202(a), 100 Stat. 853, 896-97 (1986) (amended 1990, 1991). Due to a clerical error,
the statute was later amended and renumbered as 18 U.S.C. § 2332, Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250 (1990) (amended 1991). After the clerical error was
discovered, the statute was restored to its former status as § 2331, Terrorist Acts Abroad Against
United States Nationals, Pub. L. No. 102-27, § 402, 105 Stat. 155 (1991) (amended 1991). For a
discussion of the clerical error, see 137 CoNG. REc. S2500-04 (daily ed. Feb. 1991).
6. Previous commentators, including this author, have praised § 2331 as a noble effort to fight
international terrorism. See, e.g., Patrick L. Donnely, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts
of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security And Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 599 (1987); Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United States Courts:
Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294 (1987); David S. Kris, Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 2331 Under U.S. and International Law, 27 HAxv. J. oN LEGS. 579 (1990); Philip B.
Heymann & David S. Kris, And There Should Be Other Prosecutions Too, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
1990, at B7, col. 1. However, none of these previous commentators has adequately considered the
domestic constitutional implications of § 2331's certification provision.
Two other federal statutes, and one federal rule of criminal procedure also contain certifi-
cation provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1) (1988) ("No prosecution of any offense described in this
section shall be undertaken by the United States except upon the certification in writing of the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant
Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General that in his judgment a prosecution by
the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice, which function
of certification may not be delegated."); 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1988) ("A motion by the Government
to obtain an order [to preserve witness testimony by deposition] under this section shall contain
certification by the Attorney General or his designee that the legal proceeding is against a person
who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)
("A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the
conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.
The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.").
Part III of this paper discusses these examples of certification, and compares them to certification
in § 2331.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The statute reads as follows.
Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals
(a) Homicide. Whoever kills a national of the United States, while such national is
outside the United States, shall, -
(1) if the killing is a murder as defined in section 11ll(a) of this title, be fined
under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both so
fined and so imprisoned;
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even though it addresses only terrorist attacks, § 2331 does not make "terrorism"
or "terrorist intent" an element of the offense. Instead of a substantive definition
of terrorism, the statute uses certification. The certification clause in § 2331
states:
[njo prosecution for any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by
the United States except on written certification of the Attorney General or the
highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney General with responsibility for
criminal prosecutions that, in the judgment of the certifying official, such offense
was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian
population.'
Section 2331 largely insulates the Attorney General's certification from
judicial review, at least in ordinary cases. The Committee Report on § 2331
indicates that the "determination of the certifying official is final and not subject
to judicial review." 9 However, at least one former federal district judge involved
in the drafting of § 233110 noted that certification might be judicially reviewable
in extreme cases, perhaps under an abuse-of-discretion standard.,,
(2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as defined in section 1112(a) of this
title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
and
(3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as defined in section 1112(a) of
this title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
(b) Attempt or conspiracy with respect to homicide. Whoever outside the United States
attempts to kill, or engages in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the United States
shall -
(1) in the case of an attempt to commit a killing that is a murder as defined in
this chapter, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both; and
(2) in the case of a conspiracy by two or more persons to commit a killing that
is a murder as defined in section 1111(a) of this title, if one or more of such
persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be fined under
this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both so fined
and so imprisoned.
(c) Other conduct. Whoever outside the United States engages in physical violence -
(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the United States;
or
(2) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a national of the United
States; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years
or both.
(d) Definition. As used in this section the term "national of the United States" has
the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(e) Limitation on Prosecution. No prosecution for any offense described in this section
shall be undertaken by the United States except on written certification of the
Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney General with
responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in the judgment of the certifying
official, such offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or a civilian population.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
9. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986).
10. The former judge is Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State at the
time of the congressional hearings on § 2331. See, e.g., infra note 99.
11. See infra text accompanying note 122. See also infra text accompanying notes 120-121.
The Supreme Court has interpreted similarly-worded statutes absolutely to preclude ordinary
judicial review. For example, in Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977), the Court addressed § 4(b) of
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This paper evaluates the certification clause in § 2331. Part I considers §
2331 under the formal, blackletter constitutional law governing issues such as
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which stated that "certification of the Attorney General . . . under
this section . . . shall not be reviewable in any court .... " Id. at 408 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1970 & Supp. V)). The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's holding that the language of § 4(b) allowed
"a limited jurisdiction . . . in the court to review actions which on their face are plainly in excess
of statutory authority . . . ." Id. (quoting Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
The Court did note, however, that a "bailout suit" available under the act "serves as a partial
substitute for direct judicial review." Id. at 412 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 333 (1966)). Further, the certification under § 4(b) involved only "objective statistical determi-
nations by the Census Bureau and a routine analysis of state statutes by the Justice Department,"
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333, not determinations of an individual defendant's mens rea as in § 2331.
The Court in Briscoe did not reach any other issues, including the constitutionality of certification
in § 4(b), Briscoe, 432 U.S. at 409. The Court had already held that the fifth amendment's due
process clause did not protect the states from deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 323-24. The Constitution also may not protect fully a foreign defendant involved in an
attack against an American national outside the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Despite the fact that certification in § 2331 is not judicially reviewable, courts could undoubtedly
rule on the constitutionality of the certification provision itself. "[W]here Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear .... We require this
heightened showing in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal
statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)).
In Webster, an openly homosexual CIA employee sued the Director of Central Intelligence for
firing him. The Director had exercised his discretion to "terminate the employment of any officer
or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States ...... Id. at 594 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988)). Deciding
"whether, and to what extent, the termination decisions of the Director ... are judicially reviewable,"
id., the Court found that "Congress meant to commit individual employee discharges to the Director's
discretion, and that [the Administrative Procedure Act] precludes judicial review of these decisions
.... .Id. at 601. Indeed, the Court found the statute "fairly exudes deference to the Director, and
appears to us to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review." Id. at
600. However, the Court found that Congress had not meant to remove constitutional questions
from the courts, and so reached the employee's claims under the due process clause. Id. at 603. See
United States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(6),
which stated that a decision made by the Attorney General was "not subject to judicial review," to
allow constitutional judicial review so as to avoid the "serious constitutional questions" raised by
congressional preclusion of constitutional review).
The "serious constitutional questions" involved in congressional preclusion of constitutional
judicial review arise because of a tension in the Constitution. On one hand, article III, § 1 gives
Congress the power to establish the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. "The Constitution has
defined the limits of judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it
shall be exercised by the [lower courts); consequently, the statute which does prescribe the limits of
their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated
therein." Webster, 486 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441, 449 (1850)).
On the other hand, the Bill of Rights guarantees individual rights which may require a court for
vindication. "If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be
subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is
... because . . ., under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a
requirement of judicial process." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation, 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948).
A lot of commentary exists on this tension and on other problems with congressional limitations
of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfa-
vored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 129 (1981); Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 895 (1984). See generally, ERWIN CttmRIsNKsY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
147-80 (1989).
1993] Criminal Law Certification 5
certification. Finding that the formal constitutional law yields limited insight,
Part II considers the spirit behind the formal law in conjunction with the legislative
history of § 2331, and argues that the statute clearly violates that spirit. Part III
compares certification in § 2331 with certification in three other contexts, to
highlight the specific features of the statute which make it unconstitutional. Part
IV offers a brief conclusion, and a suggestion for change in the current consti-
tutional rules.
I. BLACKLETTER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. CERTIFICATION AS A BURDEN-SHIFTING DEVICE
Certification in § 2331 ingeniously solves some of the very serious problems
associated with fighting terrorism through law.' 2 Specifically, certification removes
the thorny element of terrorist intent to "intimidate . . . a . .. population" 1 3
from § 2331. According to the statute, the government need not prove terrorist
intent at all; simple certification will do. Certification essentially acts as a super
burden-shifter, reducing the government's burden of proof on terrorist intent to
zero; correspondingly, it leaves the defendant with an infinitely high burden of
proof because he cannot rebut the certification in court.' 4 Certification substitutes
prosecutorial determination of terrorist intent for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. '"
12. Cf. John Quigley, Eliminating Terrorism: A Law and Justice Approach, 3 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 47 (1987).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1986 & Supp. III 1991). I will use the label "terrorist intent" to stand
for the "inten[t] to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population"
from the certification clause in § 2331. See id.
14. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986). But see supra notes 9-11
and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 120-121; infra text accompanying note 122.
15. As far as the defendant is concerned, certification probably requires a mere formality from
the government. But see infra text accompanying note 122. In United States v. Bronk, 604 F. Supp.
743 (W.D. Wis. 1985), the Department of Justice certified a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1).
The statute stated that "[n]o prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken
by the United States except upon certification in writing of the Attorney General or the Deputy
Attorney General that in his judgment a prosecution ... is in the public interest and necessary to
secure substantial justice . " The Department's certification read as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF THE ACTING DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
1, Roger Clegg, hereby certify that in my judgment a prosecution by the United States
of William P. Bronk under the provision of Title 18, United States Code, Section 245,





General of the United States
Id. at 748.
For a discussion of certification in 18 U.S.C. § 245, see infra notes 134-142 and accompanying
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Obviously, by shifting the burden of proof in a criminal statute, certification
raises serious constitutional questions.' 6 As the Court stated in In re Winship, 7
"[1]est there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."'" Thus certifi-
cation passes or fails constitutional muster according to whether terrorist intent
- the certified issue - is a "necessary" fact, or an element' 9 of the crime
prohibited by the statute. If terrorist intent is an element of § 2331, then
certification is unconstitutional. 20
The fact that certification may be subject to limited judicial review in extreme
cases2' does not cure its constitutional problems as a burden-shifting device.
Judicial review under an abuse-of-discretion standard of what is essentially an
administrative decision on an element of a crime would surely violate the
constitution. 22 Such judicial review obviously does not substitute for the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required by Winship.
2a
B. THE CONFUSED PROGENY OF In re Winship
Unfortunately, in the twenty-one years since Winship announced the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary facts, the Court has
not offered any clear way to distinguish "necessary" from "unnecessary" facts. 24
As one commentator puts it, the Court has "constitutionalized the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt without providing any but the most trivial
explicit criteria for its application.' '2 While the Supreme Court precedents do
16. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 519 (1979) ("It is the line of cases ... exemplified
by In re Winship that provides the appropriate mode of constitutional analysis for ... presumptions"
that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his actions (citations omitted)); Carella v.
California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989) (per curiam).
17. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18. Id. at 364. See Carella, 491 U.S. at 265 (per curiam) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
Although most of the Court's cases on burden-shifting have involved the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause, the same jurisprudence applies to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause. See LAWRENCE H. TRIE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7,
at 663-64 (2d ed. 1988).
19. I use the term "element" to refer to those facts which, under Winship, are "necessary" to
constitute the crime, and so which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Winship, 397
U.S. at 364.
20. See id.
21. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 120-121; infra
text accompanying note 122.
22. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922) ("Against the danger of ...
deprivation [of life, liberty, or property] without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the
Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law. The difference in security
of judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this Court." (citations omitted));
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975) (striking down state statute which requires the defendant
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was acting "in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation" because that issue was an element of the crime for the purposes of Winship).
23. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
24. I am referring to the line of cases beginning with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and
running through Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977), and, most recently, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) and Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228 (1987).
25. Ronald J. Alien, Rationality and Accuracy in the Criminal Process: A Discordant Note on
the Harmonizing of the Justices' Views on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 74 J. Citm. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1147 (1983) (footnote omitted).
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provide only relatively "trivial" explicit criteria, they reveal several important
themes which govern issues such as certification. This section addresses the
explicit doctrine of Winship's progeny; Part II addresses the spirit of Winship.
Beginning with explicit doctrine, a bare majority26 of the Court accepts the
presumption that a legislature's definition of a crime determines the elements of
that crime for the Winship standard. 27 "[In determining what facts must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the ... legislature's definition of the elements
of the offense is usually dispositive . . . . "2 Congress' definition of the elements
of the offense in § 2331 does not include terrorist intent: "there is no requirement
that the U.S. Government prove during the criminal prosecution the purpose of
the murder. The elements are (1) the murder (2) of a U.S. national (3) outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."129 Accordingly, on this standard,
certification appears constitutional.
Yet legislative discretion to define crimes has limits. "[I]n certain ...
circumstances Winship's reasonable-doubt requirement applies to facts not for-
mally identified as elements of the offense charged." 30 Those limits are far from
clear. In one of its most recent cases, the Court admitted, "we have never
attempted to define precisely . . . the extent to which due process forbids the
reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases .... ",31 Indeed,
the Court has offered only the following absurd examples of unconstitutional
burden-shifting to serve as boundary-markers. The legislature cannot 'declare
an individual presumptively guilty of a crime' . . . [or] 'validly command that
the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should
create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt." '32
The fact that the Court remains sharply divided on this issue only aggravates
its doctrinal uncertainty. 3a In contrast to the majority, the dissenters appear to
26. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (5-4) (no need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of insanity in homicide); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (5-4) (no need for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of visible possession of a handgun during commission of specified crimes);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (5-3) (no need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
extreme emotional disturbance in homicide); but see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (9-0)
(proof beyond a reasonable doubt of heat of passion required in homicide). Mullaney has largely
been abandoned. In McMillan, the Court stated, "[wle believe that the present case is controlled by
Patterson, our most recent pronouncement on this subject, rather than by Mullaney." McMillan, 477
U.S. at 85. A year later, in Martin, the Court reviewed the history of the burden-shifting cases,
beginning with Winship, and noticeably failed to mention Mullaney. Martin, 480 U.S. at 231-33; see
id. at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court today falls to discuss or even cite Mullaney .... ").
27. For the text of the Winship standard, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all
"necessary" facts, see supra text accompanying note 18.
28. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85; see Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 ("[T]he Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the
definition of the offense .... ").
29. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986).
30. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86; see Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 ("there are obviously constitutional
limits" to a state's power to shift the burden of proof by redefining its crimes).
31. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86; see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 241 (1987) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Today ... the Court simply asserts that [the State] law properly allocates the burdens
[of proof], without giving any indication of where th[e] limits [on burden-shifting) lie.").
32. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79,
86 (1916), Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943); other citations omitted); see McMillan,
477 U.S. at 87 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).
33. See supra note 26.
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have adopted the following clear test: "if a [legislature] provides that a specific
component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise to both a special stigma
and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 'fact necessary
to constitute the crime' within the meaning of In re Winship. ' '3 4 Yet even this
test involves uncertainty because a "special" punishment and stigma can exist
only against a given background of punishment and stigma. The choice of that
background will therefore determine the outcome of the test." In any case, the
liberal test has not prevailed. "A State [need not] prove beyond a reasonable
doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize
as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability
or the severity of the punishment" of a criminal defendant.1
6
Without question, the Court's explicit criteria for distinguishing "necessary"
from "unnecessary" facts remain somewhat paltry, even after twenty-one years
and at least four major cases.17 The blackletter constitutional doctrine in this
area has not advanced since its birth in 1970.38 Indeed, Justice Powell's criticism
of the majority opinion in Patterson v. New York, 39 that the Court "simply
leaves us without a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from legiti-
mate legislative adjustments of the burden of persuasion in criminal cases,'"'4
remains equally true today. 4' All that can be said with confidence is that the
trend has been to uphold burden-shifting statutes by a slim majority.
4 2
C. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Given the doctrinal uncertainty which pervades Winship and its progeny, it
might be tempting to argue that terrorist intent is not an element of § 2331, and
so uphold the statute. This argument would assert that terrorist intent need not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because it is merely a check on prosecutorial
discretion, and not a part of the crime prohibited. On this reading, § 2331 would
apply to all serious attacks against American nationals abroad, and certification
would merely limit use of the statute by the Justice Department to those cases
which involved terrorist intent.
However, if terrorist intent is not an element of § 2331, certification may
violate separation-of-powers doctrine. The statute provides that "[n]o prosecution
34. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented in a separate opinion, but
"agree[d] with much of Justice Stevens' dissent," id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and specifically
endorsed Justice Stevens' test for distinguishing "necessary" from "unnecessary" facts. Id. (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
35. As an example, consider § 2331 itself. To determine whether the issue of terrorist intent
gives rise to a special stigma and punishment, should the statute be compared to similar domestic
federal criminal law with no reference to terrorism, as in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1112, 1113 (1988), or
to similar extraterritorial federal criminal law with no reference to terrorism, which does not yet
exist?
36. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207.
37. See supra note 24.
38. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
39. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
40. Id. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
41. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 241 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Today ... the
Court simply asserts that [the state] law properly allocates the burdens [of proof], without giving
any indication of where th[e] limits [on burden-shifting] lie.").
42. See supra note 26.
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• . . shall be undertaken by the United States except on written certification" by
the Justice Department of the defendant's terrorist intent.4 3 This language was
intended to" and does 45 limit the Justice Department's prosecutorial discretion.
If terrorist intent is not an element, if § 2331 applies to all attacks against
Americans abroad, then certification hinders the Executive's ability to apply the
law to the cases it covers. Put simply, certification prohibits prosecution even
when the defendant has violated each and every element of the crime. This
prohibition raises separation-of-powers problems.
Modern separation-of-powers doctrine, like the doctrine of Winship's prog-
eny, is largely a matter of degree. In Morrison v. Olson," the Court considered
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1988), which allowed
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate high-ranking executive branch
officers.4 7 The question was whether "the Act, taken as a whole, violate[d] the
principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the role of the
Executive Branch. ' 4 Although the Act "undeniabl[y] . . . reduce[d] the amount
of control ... that the Attorney General and, through him, the President
exercise[d] over the . . . prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal
activity," 49 it did "give the Attorney General several means of supervising or
controlling the . . . independent counsel," 0 and did not 'impermissibly under-
mine[]' the powers of the Executive Branch or 'disrupt[] the proper balance
between the coordinate branches by preventing the Executive Branch from ac-
complishing its constitutionally assigned functions.""'' The Court upheld the Act
7 to 1.52
Prima facie, the flexible approach of Morrison appears able to accommodate
§ 2331. After all, "the three Branches of Government [need not] 'operate with
absolute independence."'5 3 Certification is not a major intrusion into executive
turf. Certainly it does not present a potentially-ongoing interference with &ecutive
functions of the type struck down in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.54
However, certification poses a different problem than the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act which was upheld in Morrison. The Ethics Act was designed to facilitate
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 120-121.
45. See infra text accompanying note 122.
46. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
47. Id. at 660. See also n.2.
48. Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 695.
50. Id. at 696.
51. Id. at 695 (citations omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 856 (1986), Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
52. Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Kennedy did not participate. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697.
53. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-94 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974);
other citations omitted).
54. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha involved a statute which allowed the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service to suspend the deportations of some aliens, subject to a veto by either house of
Congress. The Court struck down the veto provision of the statute because it was "essentially
legislative," id. at 952, and therefore required bi-cameral passage and presentment to the President
as required by Article I. Id. at 945-946. LAWRENCE H. TRE, AMEaIcAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 4-
3, at 214-15 (2d ed. 1988). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (discussing Chadha).
Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 ("Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision
over an independent counsel.").
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investigation of high-ranking executive branch officials.55 Accordingly, the special
prosecutor had to be partially independent from the executive branch. By contrast,
from a separation-of-powers standpoint, certification limits prosecution of ordi-
nary crimes. It interferes with the "Executive Branch['s] ...exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case .... "56 Certification
represents a case of 'congressional usurpation of [an] Executive Branch func-
tion[]' ' ' 57 - indeed, a core executive function 8 - ordinary law enforcement.
Congress has no direct constitutional role to play in that area;59 prosecution is
not "incidental to the legislative function of Congress."0 Thus, even relatively
minor restrictions may be "of such a nature that they impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty." ' 6' By imposing limits on the use of §
2331, even when all of its elements have been met, certification may "interfere
with the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally
appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed .... ,,,62
Ultimately, either terrorist intent is an element of § 2331, or it is not. If it
is an element, then the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt,63
and certification violates due process. If terrorist intent is not an element, then
certification may represent a legislative interference with executive discretion, and
violate separation-of-powers." This conundrum applies even though certification
in § 2331 is largely not judicially (or congressionally) reviewable. 65 For as the
legislative history of § 2331 indicates, Congress intended the certification clause
not as a mere formality," but as a check on prosecutorial discretion.
67
To survive, certification must occupy the very narrow space between the
Scylla of due process, and the Charybdis of separation-of-powers. Whether the
55. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. See also n.2.
56. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869), United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965)). See also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Although prosecutorial discretion may be "a fading talisman [when used] to justify the Uudicial]
unreviewability" of decisions to prosecute, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 849 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (emphasis added), congressional influence on prosecutorial discretion still raises serious
separation-of-powers issues. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
57. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)).
58. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-91.
59. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 192-93 (1880)) ("powers [of law enforcement] are assigned under our Constitution to the
Executive and the Judiciary"); see also U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § I (placing "All legislative Powers herein
granted" in the Congress), art. II, § 3 requiring the President to "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.").
60. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (citations omitted).
61. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
62. Id. at 689-90. The fact that the President's execution of the laws must be "faithful" to the
congressional intent only engenders the questions discussed above on a different level. The President
must not be "faithful" to a congressional intent which violates the constitutional separation-of-
powers doctrine.
63. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
64. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693.
65. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986). See also supra notes 9-11;
infra text accompanying notes 120-121; infra text accompanying note 122. Cf. supra note 11.
66. Cf supra note 15.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 120-122.
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space exists at all in this context, and whether, if it does, it can accommodate
certification, is unclear. Neither the flexible approach of Morrison nor the
confused approach of Winship's progeny produce very sharp lines.
However, retreating from doctrine produces some perspective on the problem.
The certification clause of § 2331 is objectionable not because it violates sepa-
ration-of-powers, 68 but because it attempts an end-run around Winship. As Part
II makes clear, certification was designed primarily to eliminate the government's
burden of proof on the issue of terrorist intent, and, once this was accomplished,
only secondarily to restrict the use of the statute. Part II argues that the intent
to eliminate the burden of proof violates the spirit of Winship, and marks
certification as unconstitutional.
II. THE SPIRIT OF WINSHIP
A. THE CAsEs
While Winship and its progeny leave a confused trail of blackletter law, they
do articulate a constitutional and a political vision which helps distinguish
"necessary" from "unnecessary" facts. Essentially, a slim majority69 of the Court
trusts legislatures to write their laws fairly, with the proper respect for the rule
and policies of Winship.70 As Justice White stated in Patterson:
[lhong before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted
rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative
defenses were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such abuses
or such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's
burden that a new constitutional rule was required."
The Court often has repeated the idea that legislatures can be trusted. 72
Of course the dissenters have articulated a different vision. Fearing that the
"test the Court . . . [has] establishe[d] allows a legislature to shift, virtually at
will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case,
' 73
Justice Powell wrote:
[tlo be sure, it is unlikely that legislatures will rewrite their criminal laws in [an]
extreme form. The Court seems to think this likelihood of restraint is an added
reason for limiting review largely to formalistic examination. But it is completely
foreign to this Court's responsibility for constitutional adjudication to limit the
scope of judicial review because of the expectation - however reasonable -
that legislative bodies will exercise appropriate restraint.7"'
68. On the current Court, I expect that only Justice Scalia, who wrote blistering dissents in
Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) and in the later case of Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989), could be convinced by the separation-of-powers attack on certification.
69. See supra note 26.
70. However, as Justice Powell pointed out in dissent in Patterson, the Court has not given a
clear indication of what "fair" means in this constitutional context. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 225
(Powell, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 211 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
72. See, e.g., id. at 211 n.12; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-91; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232
(1987) (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02).
73. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Regardless of whose vision is accurate, the important issues revolve around
whether a statute raises "the specter ... of [legislatures] restructuring existing
crimes in order to 'evade' the commands of Winship . . . . " Intuitively, both
the majority and dissenting opinions recognize that if Winship is to retain any
force at all, it must apply to more than the elements of the crime as defined by
the legislature. If legislative definitions control, then clever draftsmanship -
rewriting crimes to include fewer elements - can undermine Winship, and remove
virtually all of the prosecution's burden of proof.
As an example of the dangers involved in a purely formal implementation
of Winship, consider the following brief hypothetical. Faced with ever-expanding
drug-trafficking on the D.C. city streets, Congress decides to write .a new narcotics
law, the Statute To Undermine the Proliferation of Illegal Drugs, or STUPID.
Congress determines that the problem is particularly severe late at night, and
that drug dealers often use weapons. The first draft of the statute articulates the
main elements of the crime: "It shall be a crime to (1) be on the streets after
midnight while (2) possessing more than 10 grams of a controlled substance, and
(3) carrying an unlicensed handgun."
In hearings on STUPID, the Department of Justice, frustrated with its past
inability to convict drug dealers, suggests that Congress rewrite the statute to
make things easier on the government. Congress agrees, and after several weeks,
the following new version of STUPID emerges. "(1) It shall be a crime to be on
the streets after'midnight. (2) No prosecution for any offense described in this
statute shall be undertaken by the United States except on written certification
from a federal prosecutor that, in his judgment, such offense involved a defendant
carrying (A) more than 10 grams of a controlled substance, and (B) an unlicensed
handgun."
Of course STUPID would never be passed; it is only a specter. 76 But it does
illustrate the dangers that loom on the horizon of a purely formal implementation
of Winship. As Justice Powell wrote in Patterson, a purely formal application
of Winship
becomes an exercise in arid formalities .... [and] a rather simplistic lesson in
statutory draftsmanship .... [A] state statute could pass muster under [a formal
implementation of Winship] if it defined murder as mere physical contact between
the defendant and the victim leading to the victim's death, but then set up an
affirmative defense leaving it to the defendant to prove that he acted without
culpable mens rea. The State, in other words, could be relieved altogether of
responsibility for proving anything regarding the defendant's state of mind,
provided only that the face of the statute meets the [formal] drafting [require-
ments].77
75. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89 (footnote omitted). For the text of the Winship command, requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of a crime, see supra text accompanying note 18.
76. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, it is unlikely that
legislatures will rewrite their criminal laws in this extreme form.").
77. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 224 & n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Cf. McMillan,
477 U.S. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Consider, for example, a statute making presence 'in any
private or public place' a 'felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment' and yet allowing 'an
affirmative defense for the defendant to prove, to a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not
robbing a bank."' (quoting Fernand N. Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment
on the Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 380, 383 (1980))).
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Part IIB, below, argues that the legislative history of § 2331 exposes the
statute as a lesser version of STUPID, which raises many (though not all
7 8) of
the same constitutional problems. It presents § 2331 as the result of a legislature
exceeding the "constitutional limits beyond which [it] may not go" 79 in shifting
the burden of proof in a criminal statute. In Justice Rehnquist's inimitable prose,
Part IIB shows how certification of terrorist intent became "a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense" 0 of § 2331.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of § 2331 reveals that the central reason for using
certification was to evade the commands of Winship. Section 2331 began in the
Senate as an antiterrorist bill with a substantive definition of terrorism as one
of the elements of the crime. After discussions with the Justice Department on
the difficulty of proving terrorism and terrorist intent beyond a reasonable doubt,
§ 2331 was rewritten to include certification. Because of the importance of the
legislative process to the constitutionality of burden-shifting statutes,8' the follow-
ing paragraphs carefully review the legislative history of certification in § 2331.
1. Terrorism Before § 2331
During 1985, the U.S. witnessed a series of dramatic terrorist attacks abroad,
which resulted in the death of several Americans. s2 On June 14, gunmen com-
mandeered TWA Flight 847 with 104 Americans aboard, and forced the pilot to
land the jet in Beirut, Lebanon. 3 Once on the ground, the hijackers shot and
killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem.8 Less than four months later, on October
78. For example, if it prescribed any substantial punishment, STUPID would surely raise an
eighth-amendment issue, which would not apply to § 2331. Some scholars have suggested the eighth
amendment as the only limit to a legislature's power to shift the burden of proof. See, e.g., John
C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan, III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 Y A L. J. 1325, 1365 (1979) ("In our view, the only sensible construction of Winship is
one that demands, as an essential of due process, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of facts sufficient
to justify penalties of the sort contemplated. In other words, Winship should be read to assert a
constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a constitutionally adequate basis
for imposing the punishment authorized.").
79. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
80. McMillan, 470 U.S. at 88.
81. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. See Robert D. McFadden, Survivors Tell of Attacks at Two Airports, N.Y. TIw.s, Dec 28,
1985, at 6, col. 1. See also 132 CONG. REc. S1382 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) ("The Congress hereby
finds that - (a) between 1968 and 1985, there were over eight thousand incidents of international
terrorism, over 50 per centum of which were directed against American targets.") (passed by the
Senate, February 19, 1986); 132 CONG. REc. S1385 (discussing "the U.S. citizens who were murdered
at the Rome and Vienna airports in the recent incidents") (statement of Sen. Specter); 132 CoNG.
REc. S1386 ("Mr. President, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the recent atrocities at the Rome
and Vienna airports have given new urgency to the debate over the proper U.S. response to
international terrorism.") (statement of Sen. Leahy); 132 CoNG. REc. H1244 (daily ed. March 18,
1986) ("As we have become all too aware, terrorist attacks are growing at an average annual rate
of about 12 to 15 percent, and have become an ever-present threat throughout the world. Most
recently, the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro brutally slayed Leon Klinghoffer, a partially
paralyzed New York appliance shop owner on the trip as a 36th wedding anniversary present to his
wife.") (statement of Rep. Ackerman).
83. N.Y. Tams, June 15, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
84. Richard Halloran, Slain Passenger Was a Navy Diver, N.Y. Tmms, June 18, 1985, at 9, col.
6. See Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government
Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing on S. 1373, S. 1429, and S. 1508 Before the Subcomm.
on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1985)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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7, 1985, several heavily-armed men hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro,
and killed American Leon Klinghoffer.15 Finally, on December 27, terrorists
opened fire with automatic weapons near the El Al terminals in the Rome and
Vienna airports, killing twenty persons, including five Americans.
6
2. Initial Congressional Reaction: "Terrorism" as an Element of the Crime
Congress responded quickly and forcefully to the terrorist attacks: on July
10, 1985, Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 1429, the precursor to § 2331, a
bill to authorize prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals abroad.
8 7
Senator Specter, himself a former prosecutor, 8 intended to "establish jurisdiction
in the courts of the United States of America to protect U.S. interests around
the world when they are attacked by terrorism . "..."89 Ultimately, S. 1429
merged with H.R. 4151 and was signed by President Reagan on August 27,
1986. 90
From its birth, S. 1429 was an antiterrorist law, part of "action ... needed
to deter the international threat of terrorism." 91 During hearings on S. 1429 and
H.R. 4151, its House counterpart, 92 members of Congress expressed their outrage
at terrorism. "I just do not think the citizens of this country nor the citizens of
the world will sit by any longer and watch 11-year old girls gunned down in
airports and elderly wheelchair-bound men shot and then thrown into the ocean." 93
The first versions of S. 1429 contained a substantive definition of terrorism.
Naturally enough, in an effort to fight violent terrorist attacks, the original
drafters of S. 1429 articulated both the violent actions - murder, attempted
murder, assaults, and conspiracies94 - and the special terrorist mens rea required
for conviction.95 On July 30, 1985, in hearings before the Senate, S. 1429 read
as follows:
(a) Whoever in an act of international terrorism kills or attempts to kill any
national of the United States shall be punished ....
85. John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized; Hijackers Demand Release of Fifty Palestinians
in Israel, N.Y. Tmas, Oct. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 4. See supra note 82.
86. John Tagliabue, Airport Terrorists Kill Thirteen and Wound 113 At Israeli Counters in
Rome and Vienna: Four Attackers Killed, N.Y. TuMEs, Dec. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
87. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See 132 CONG. REc. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986).
88. See Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 36, 43.
89. See id. at 40, 41-42.
90. 1985-1986 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,027, 35,072 (1986). This and the preceding paragraph were
adapted from Kris, supra note 6, at 579-80.
91. Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Hearing on H.R. 4294 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter House Hearings]. See
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986).
92. See 1985-1986 Cong. Index, supra note 90, at 21,027, 35,072. See also, House Hearings,
supra note 91, at 22 ("Is your bill [H.R. 41511 identical with the Senate bill that Senator Specter
introduced, S. 1429, Mr. Wyden? .... Yes, there are some numbering differences, but no substantive
differences.") (question from Rep. McCollum; answer from Rep. Wyden).
93. House Hearings, supra note 91, at 19 (statement of Rep. Wyden). See also, e.g., 132 CONG.
REc. S1382-88 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (referring to terrorists as "these most heinous criminals")
(statement of Sen. Specter); 132 CONG. REc. S1386 (referring to the "recent atrocities at the Rome
and Vienna airports") (statement of Sen. Leahy); 132 CONG. REc. S1387 (referring to terrorists as
"these vile murderers" and "these barbaric criminals") (statement of Sen. Hatch).
94. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131 CONG. REc. S1441 (daily ed. July 11, 1985); see
Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 36-37.
95. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131 CONG. REc. S1441 (daily ed. July 11, 1985); see
Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 36-37.
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(b) Whoever in an act of international terrorism assaults, strikes, wounds ...
or makes any other violent attack upon ...any national of the United States
...shall be fined ....
(c) For the purposes of this section, "international terrorism" is used as defined
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, title 50, section 1801(c).96
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act contained the following substantive
definition of terrorism:
"International terrorism" means activities that - (1) involve violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended -
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(3) occur totally outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
or seek asylum.Y
At the Senate Hearings on S. 1429, Senators Specter and Hatch had the following
discussion concerning the definition of terrorism in § 1801(c).
Senator SPECTER .... I think [the definition of terrorism in § 1801(c)] is a
sound definition.
Senator HATCH. I think it is, too, and I believe it has been upheld by the
courts. Do you see any possible problems with that definition?
Senator SPECTER. I do not. Terrorism is not easy to define. That definition
has been used after a lot of deliberation, and I think it is a good one.
Senator HATCH. OK.9s
3. Justice Department Reaction to "Terrorism" as an. Element of the Crime
Unfortunately, the definition of terrorism in § 1801(c) did not satisfy
everyone. Between the Senate Hearings on S. 1429 on July 30, 1985, and the
House Hearings on March 4, 1986, the Justice Department (and the State
Department) worked with Senator Specter's staff, and modified S. 1429 to exclude
any reference to terrorism.9 (The title of the bill remained "An act . . . to
96. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), Quoted in Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 8
(emphasis added).
97. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1988).
98. Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 43-44. At the time of the Senate Hearings, July 30, 1985,
the definition of terrorism in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) recently had been upheld by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1984). Senator Hatch cited the case in later
comments to the Senate. 132 Cong. Rec. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986).
99. "But, basically what we did as we worked together with the Senate in developing Senator
Specter's bill, S. 1429 . . . we did not want to have to prove as an element of the crime, someone's
political beliefs." House Hearings, supra note 91, at 29 (statement of Victoria Toensing, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice); id. at 39 ("The Department of State understands
and appreciates this committee's desire to do something about terrorism. It is a problem that confronts
and frustrates us all. Mr. Chairman, I have worked with other committees of this Congress, and I
am perfectly willing to work closely with you and this subcommittee on specific bills, roll up my
sleeves, sit down, work with my staff in improving anything you want to put forward. I worked
with Senator Specter on the bill [S. 1429] that was just passed in the Senate . (statement of
Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State)).
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authorize prosecution of terrorists who attack United States nationals abroad
. . . .")100 This change in wording did not reflect a change in the purpose of the
bill. Unquestionably, the driving - and limiting - force behind S. 1429 remained
a determination to combat terrorism.'
0'
During the House Hearings on S. 1429, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Victoria Toensing explained why the Justice Department had worked to remove
"terrorism" from the substance of S. 1429.
Our major concern ... is ... inclusion of [terrorist intent] as an element of the
offense. [Terrorist intent] is . .. an extremely difficult element to prove'1 ...
[W]e did not want a person's political motive, their reason for committing the
crime, as an element of the crime because then it would be impossible to prove
it. It would make a circus in the courtroom.... We do not want it in the
elements .... [W]e do not want to have to prove it1o3. . . . [T]o put [terrorist
intent] in the statute to prove as an element of the offense, would make it
virtually impossible to be able to conduct a successful courtroom prosecution.'0'
Abraham Sofaer, the Legal Advisor to the State Department, and a former
district judge from the Southern District of New York, echoed Ms. Toensing's
concerns, "[tierrorism cannot be defined in any manner that is generally accept-
able for a criminal statute, where precision is required. Prior efforts have led to
tortured results ... ."01 Judge Sofaer also stated, "[w]e would not be surprised
if the Department of Justice had concerns about making it an element of the
offense that the deed in question have been done 'in an act of international
terrorism.' This requirement could raise evidentiary . . . problems that could
unduly complicate prosecutions under this legislation."'06
Ms. Toensing and Mr. Sofaer repeated their positions several times through-
out the hearings,107 emphasizing that the "major concern [of the Justice Depart-
ment] . . . is . . . [to avoid] inclusion of motive as an element of the offense."' 08
Indeed, Ms. Toensing was so vehement about excluding a substantive definition
of terrorism from antiterrorist bills that she offered her own staff to work with
Representative Hughes, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism, to rewrite another antiterrorist bill. "I offer my staff to work
with you, Mr. Chairman, because it is very important to us we do not have to
prove [terrorist intent] as an element of the offense."'' 9
4. The Final Version of § 2331: Certification of "Terrorism"
By the time of its incorporation into the United States Code as § 2331, the
statute eschewed a definition of terrorism, and merely defined the violent crimes,
100. Id. at 13 (title of S. 1429).
101. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986) ("The committee of
conference does not intend that [§ 2331] reach nonterrorist violence inflicted upon American victims.
Simple barroom brawls or normal street crime, for example, are not intended to be covered by this
provision.").
102. House Hearings, supra note 91, at 35.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Id. at 45.
105. Id. at 42. See Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 63.
106. Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 68 (prepared statement).
107. See House Hearings, supra, note 91, at 29, 35, 50, 52-53, 56.
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id. at 56.
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attempts, and conspiracies which it prohibited, "there is no requirement that the
U.S. Government prove during the criminal prosecution the purpose of the
murder. The elements are (1) the murder (2) of a U.S. national (3) outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.""10 Nonetheless, the motivating force
behind § 2331 - terrorism - remained central. "[T]he committee of conference
does not intend that [the law] reach nonterrorist violence inflicted upon American
victims. Simple barroom brawls or normal street crime, for example, are not
intended to be covered by this provision.""'
To ensure that § 2331 would be used only against terrorists, the law required
the Attorney General to certify that an offense to be prosecuted under the statute
was in fact terrorism.11 2 Indeed, the final version of § 2331 contained a certifi-
cation provision prohibiting prosecution by the United States absent written
certification from the Attorney General (or a high-ranking subordinate)." 3 Cer-
tification was designed to remove "terrorism" as an element of the crime to be
proven under § 2331.1"
4
Most members of Congress apparently approved of the substitution of
certification for a definition of terrorism. The first version of S. 1429 to include
a certification provision passed the Senate 92 - 0 on February 19, 1986.11
However, not all members of Congress were entirely pleased with the bill,
even if they voted for it. Senator Hatch noted: "I regret that the bill does not
define terrorism per se, and . . . I believe in the need for a statutory definition
of international terrorism . "... ,6 Senator Hatch also stated, "[i]f we are merely
to penalize terrorist attacks, then the definition of terrorism as provided by the
original bill in section 2(c), relying upon the definition of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, is much more preferable.""11 7 Senator Specter also seemed
reluctant to abandon a definition of terrorism: "the bill does not attempt to
define terrorism. However, those seeking guidance on this issue can refer to the
definition provided in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, title 50, section
1801(c)."" 8 During the House Hearings, Representative Hughes stated,
[wiell, we will attempt to deal with just exactly how terrorism is defined. I must
tell you candidly I have some problems with attempting to draft legislation that
is not a little more specific as to what we intend to catch by way of criminal
conduct prosecutable in this country, but we will continue to work with you
119
Further, the certification clause in § 2331 tracked the language from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's definition of terrorism 20 because Congress
110. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986).
111. Id.
112. Id. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 120-121; infra text accompanying note 122.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). For the text of the certification clause in
§ 2331(e), see supra text accompanying note 8.
114. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986). But see infra text accompanying
notes 120-121; infra text accompanying note 122.
115. 132 CONG. REc. S1382 (daily ed. Feb 19, 1986).
116. Id. at S1386.
117. 132 CONG. REc. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986).
118. 132 CONG. REc. S1382 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). Although Senator Specter made this
statement before the House Hearings, the substitution of certification for the definition of terrorism
had already occurred. See supra note 117.
119. House Hearings, supra note 91, at 56.
120. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1988); see supra note 97, accompanying text.
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was unwilling to let legislative history alone guide the Justice Department.
Congress wanted to ensure that § 2331 would be used only against terrorism.
Mr. HUGHES. We do not want to capture the barroom brawl. We do not want
to capture other types of attacks upon Americans that basically are not within
the realm of terrorist-type attacks.
Mr. SOFAER. But it is inconceivable that the Attorney General of the United
States ... would reach out to try to take jurisdiction over such activity overseas.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Sofaer, I thought that too. We passed a pharmacy robbery
statute which I thought was rather specific. It had a $500 threshold. The Justice
Department interpreted that to mean $5,000 ... attorneys general sometimes do
not necessarily comply with the letter of the law; and to suggest that it is adequate
... not [to] put [the definition of terrorism] in [the] statute is a little bit unusual.
You are going to have problems getting courts to follow the intent when it is in
the [elements of the] statute, let alone when it is not .... 2
Certification represented a compromise of sorts, allowing terrorist intent partly
to limit prosecutorial discretion without requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. As Judge Sofaer stated,
if the Attorney General or a U.S. attorney somewhere really abuses his discretion
under this law [and brings a case which does not involve terrorist intent], a
motion could be made to a district judge, in some egregious case of some kind,
and I would not be surprised if something were done about it.22
C. CERTIFICATION AS AN ATTEMPT TO EVADE Winship
The lengthy 23 legislative history of S. 1429 makes two points absolutely
clear. First, the bill was designed and intended to fight terrorism, not mere
"barroom brawl[s]."' 24 There is no evidence that Congress intended to extend
the law to cover every act of serious violence against American nationals outside
the country; all the evidence points to a desire to prohibit only terrorist attacks.1'
2
Indeed, coverage of all attacks would have almost certainly violated international
law, 2 6 and would have been, at the least, "controversial and precedent-setting
''127
Second, the final version of § 2331 used certification rather than a definition
of terrorism because the Justice Department did not want to have to prove
terrorist intent as an element of the crime. Despite an extant definition of
terrorism in another federal criminal law, and despite the clear intent of Congress
to fight only terrorism, § 2331 eschewed a definition of the term and resorted
to certification because the Justice Department felt that it could not prove terrorist
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
121. House Hearings, supra note 91, at 56.
122. Id. at 54.
123. See id. at 54 (the law "has much more stronger legislative history in it than an ordinary
bill.") (statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
124. See, e.g., id. at 44; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986).
125. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986).
126. See generally Kris, supra note 6, at 587-96.
127. 132 CONG. Rac. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986) (statement of Senator Specter).
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These two points combine to cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of
certification in § 2331. The legislative history reveals that terrorist intent is the
"tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."' 2 Section 2331 was
conceived, designed and promulgated to fight terrorism, not other violent attacks.
Congress never intended to prohibit even the most serious non-terrorist violence.
To paraphrase Justice Rehnquist, terrorist intent was always the "dog" of the
statute. But certification removed terrorist intent from the formal elements of
the statute, and allowed the Justice Department to determine its existence virtually
free from judicial scrutiny or review, transforming terrorist intent into the mere
"tail" of the offense. Yet even after all the draftsmanship and legislative tinkering,
terrorist intent remained the central issue in § 2331, and continued to "wag[] the
dog of the substantive offense.'
29
Further, § 2331 required certification rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt precisely to "'evade' the commands of Winship .... *,3o Clearly, the
Justice Department feared having to prove terrorist intent beyond a reasonable
doubt. That fear may have been legitimate. Removing the central and motivating
element of a criminal statute because of fears that it would be too hard to prove
was not legitimate, at least when the legislature was clearly not ready to give up
the limiting force of that element and indicated as much in the text of the statute.
III. - HYPOTHETICAL CASES
So far, I have tried to make two main points. First, in Part I, certification
at least arguably violates either the blackletter constitutional law of Winship and
its progeny or the separation of powers. Second, in Part II, certification clearly
violates the spirit underlying the blackletter law of Winship and its progeny.
However, because the blackletter rules from Part I were "trivial,"' 31 and because
"spirit" is inherently somewhat vague, this Part considers several hypothetical
cases to help map out the constitutional terrain surrounding certification, and to
emphasize the special problems with certification in § 2331.
Certification exists in at least three other places in the federal law: two
federal statutes,1 32 and one Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.' 33 In this section,
I evaluate these three examples of certification and compare them to certification
in § 2331.
A. CERTIFICATION IN 18 U.S.C. § 245
18 U.S.C. § 245, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, enumerates certain
"Federally Protected Activities," such as voting or serving on a jury, and provides
fines and imprisonment for persons who prevent others from engaging in these
activities.' 34 The statute contains a certification clause similar in form to that in
128. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
131. Allen, supra note 25, at 1147.
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 245(a)(1), 3503(a) (1988).
133. FED. R. CRmd. P. 42.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1988). The statute reads as follows:
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§ 2331. It prohibits prosecution absent particular, written determinations by the
Attorney General or one of his subordinates.
(a) (1) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of Congress to prevent any State, any possession or Commonwealth of the
United States, or the District of Columbia, from exercising jurisdiction over
any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this
section, nor shall anything in this section be construed as depriving State and
local law enforcement authorities of responsibility for prosecuting acts that
may be violations of this section and that are violations of State and local
law. No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken
by the United States except upon the certification in writing of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or
any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General
that in his judgment a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest
and necessary to secure substantial justice, which function of certification may
not be delegated.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of Federal
officers, or a Federal grand jury, to investigate possible violations of this
section.
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with ...
(1) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person
or any other person or any class of persons from ...
(A) voting or qualifying to vote, qualifying or campaigning as a candidate
for elective office, or qualifying or acting as a poll watcher, or any
legally authorized election official, in any primary, special, or general
election;
(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program,
facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States;
(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any
agency of the United States;
(D) serving, or attending upon any court in connection with possible service,
as a grand or petit juror in any court of the United States;
(E) participating in or enjoying the benefits of any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance; or
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because
he is or has been -
(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college;
(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program,
facility or activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision
thereof;
(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any
private employer or any agency of any State or subdivision thereof, or
joining or using the services or advantages of any labor organization,
hiring hall, or employment agency;
(D) serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with
possible service, as a grand or petit juror;
(E) traveling in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any
vehicle, terminal, or facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water,
or air;
(F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accom-
modations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom,
lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves the public
and which is principally engaged in selling food or beverages for con-
sumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, or of any motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or any other
place of exhibition or entertainment which serves the public, or of any
other establishment which serves the public and (i) which is located within
the premises of any of the aforesaid establishments or within the premises
of which is physically located any of the aforesaid establishments, and
(ii) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such establishments; or
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No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by
the United States except upon the certification in writing of the Attorney General,
[or various of his high-ranking subordinates], that in his judgment a prosecution
by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial
justice, which function of certification may not be delegated. 3,
Substantively, however, the certification clause of § 245 does not pose the same
problems as the clause of § 2331. It does not violate separation of powers, or
the letter or spirit of the burden-shifting cases.
Certification in § 245 does not limit prosecutorial discretion. The issue to
be certified in § 245 - that a prosecution is "in the public interest and necessary
to secure substantial justice" - is virtually an empty shell, and can be filled
with whatever the Justice Department desires. No prosecutor in good faith ever
brings a case without the belief that it will secure "substantial justice" and aid
(3) during or incident to a riot or civil disorder, any person engaged in a business
in commerce or affecting commerce, including, but not limited to, any person
engaged in a business which sells or offers for sale to interstate travelers a
substantial portion of the articles, commodities, or services which it sells or
where a substantial portion of the articles or commodities which it sells or
offers for sale have moved in commerce; or
(4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person
or any other person or class of persons from -
(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion
or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in
subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through
(2)(F); or
(B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection
to so participate; or
(5) any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such citizen
or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to
participate, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or
national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs
(1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through (2)(F), or participating
lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity
to so participate... shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if
death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life. As used in this section the term "participating lawfully in speech or
peaceful assembly" shall not mean the aiding, abetting, or inciting of other
persons to riot or to commit any act of physical violence upon any individual
or against any real or personal property in furtherance of a riot. Nothing in
subparagraph (2)(F) or (4)(A) of this subsection shall apply to the proprietor
of any establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, or to any
employee acting on behalf of such proprietor, with respect to the enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of such establishment if such establishment is located within a building which
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually
occupied by the proprietor as his residence.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to deter any law enforcement
officer from lawfully carrying out the duties of his office; and no law enforcement
officer shall be considered to be in violation of this section for lawfully carrying
out the duties of his office or lawfully enforcing ordinances and laws of the United
States, the District of Columbia, any of the several States, or any political
subdivision of a State. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "law
enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States, the District of
Columbia, a State, or political subdivision of a State, who is empowered by law
to conduct investigations of, or make arrests because of, offenses against the
United States, the District of Columbia, a State, or political subdivision of a State.
135. Id. § 245(a)(1).
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the "public interest." Indeed, certification in § 245 could limit good-faith
prosecutorial discretion only if the Attorney General of the United States de-
manded to prosecute a case despite his publicly-admitted belief that the prose-
cution was unjust or against the public interest. Any prosecutor willing to do
this, of course, would simply falsify the certification, precisely because § 245(a)(1)
does not require certification of any substantive issue.
By contrast, § 2331 requires certification of a difficult issue - indeed, the
most difficult issue in early drafts of the statute. Unlike the ironically labeled
"substantial justice" of § 245, "terrorist intent" has real substance; it is not an
empty shell. 36 If terrorist intent is not an element of § 2331, then requiring
certification of that intent as a prerequisite to prosecution does limit the "absolute
[prosecutorial] discretion' " 37 of the executive. 3
It seems clear that Congress wrote a certification clause into § 245 not to
limit prosecutorial discretion, but to limit the class of persons who could exercise
it. Section 245 covers a wide range of controversial conduct, and Congress was
within its rights to demand high-level input into the decision to prosecute. 39 The
nondelegation clause in § 245(a)(1),140 missing from § 2331, only reinforces this
point. Certification in § 245 does not limit prosecutorial discretion in any
meaningful way.
Certification in § 245 also accords with Winship and its progeny. Clearly,
the legislature did not intend the "fact" of a prosecution being "in the public
interest" as an element of the crime. Presumptively, then, the fact is not
"necessary" for Winship.'41 Indeed, the absurdity of making this "fact" an
element illustrates that certification in § 245 accords with the spirit behind the
Winship cases as well. Certification in § 245, unlike its counterpart in § 2331,
did not result from prosecutorial fear of the "reasonable doubt" standard. No
sensible criminal statute would ever require the government to prove that its
prosecution accorded with "substantial justice" and the "public interest," because
those issues exist outside the realm of the defendant's conduct and state of mind.
They could never be "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime"' 42 with which a
defendant is charged, and thus do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or any proof at all. The certified issues in § 245 have nothing to do with the
defendant per se, but only with the executive branch's perception of him and his
actions.
In short, § 245 illustrates the permissive use of certification as a device for
ensuring high-level input into a decision to prosecute without actually limiting
prosecutorial discretion. Unlike § 2331, it does not shift the burden of proof on
any issue which could conceivably be an element of the crime.
136. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
137. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965)).
138. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
139. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
140. The last clause of § 245(a)(1) states, "which function of certification may not be delegated."
141. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
142. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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B. CERTIFICATION IN 18 U.S.C. § 3503
18 U.S.C. § 3503 allows a court to order the deposition of a witness in a
criminal case in "exceptional circumstances,"'' 43 and requires that "[a] motion
by the Government to obtain an order under this section shall contain certification
by the Attorney General or his designee that the legal proceeding is against a
person who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity."'"
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1988).
144. Id. The statute reads as follows:
(a) Whenever due to exceptional circumstances it is in the interest of justice that the
testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved, the court at any
time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon motion of such party
and notice to the parties, order that the testimony of such witness be taken by deposition
and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material
not privileged be produced at the same time and place. If a witness is committed for
failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or hearing, the court on written motion
of the witness and upon notice to the parties may direct that his deposition be taken.
After the deposition has been subscribed the court may discharge the witness. A motion
by the Government to obtain an order under this section shall contain certification by
the Attorney General or his designee that the legal proceeding is against a person who
is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity.
(b) The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken shall give to every party
reasonable written notice of the time and place for taking the deposition. The notice
shall state the name and address of each person to be examined. On motion of a party
upon whom the notice is served, the court for cause shown may extend or shorten the
time or change the place for taking the deposition. The officer having custody of a
defendant shall be notified of the time and place set for the examination, and shall
produce him at the examination and keep him in the presence of the witness during the
examination. A defendant not in custody shall have the right to be present at the
examination, but his failure, absent good cause shown, to appear after notice and tender
of expenses shall constitute a waiver of that right and of any objection to the taking
and use of the deposition based upon that right.
(c) If a defendant is without counsel, the court shall advise him of his rights and
assign counsel to represent him unless the defendant elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel of his own choice. Whenever a deposition is taken at the
instance of the Government, or whenever a deposition is taken at the instance of a
defendant who appears to be unable to bear the expense ofthe taking of the deposition,
the court may direct that the expenses of travel and subsistence of the defendant and
his attorney for attendance at the examination shall be paid by the Government. In
such event the marshal shall make payment accordingly.
(d) A deposition shall be taken and filed in the manner provided in civil actions,
provided that (1) in no event shall a deposition be taken of a party defendant without
his consent, and (2) the scope of examination and cross-examination shall be such as
would be allowed in the trial itself. On request or waiver by the defendant the court
may direct that a deposition be taken on written interrogatories in the manner provided
in civil actions. Such request shall constitute a waiver of any objection to the taking
and use of the deposition based upon its being so taken.
(e) The Government shall make available to the defendant for his examination and
use at the taking of the deposition any statement of the witness being deposed which
is in the possession of the Government and which the Government would be required
to make available to the defendant if the witness were testifying at the trial.
(f) At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears: That the witness is
dead; or that the witness is out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence
of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity; or that the witness refuses
in the trial or hearing to testify concerning the subject of the deposition or part offered;
or that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of
the witness by subpoena. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the purpose
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At first glance, § 3503 appears to exhibit some of the same problems as §
2331. The statute essentially requires certification that the defendant in the case
is involved in organized crime. Perhaps this fact, used as an element of the crime
in some federal criminal statutes,' 45 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
If so, then certification in § 3503 is as unconstitutional as its counterpart in §
2331.
In fact, however, § 3503 does not pose a constitutional problem, because
the statute does not define a crime. Section 3503 merely governs the use of
depositions in federal court. The defendant does not suffer any direct harm from
prosecutorial certification that the government suspects him of engaging in
organized crime. Even the dissenters in the burden-shifting cases would not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the certified issue in § 3503. After
all, no punishment flows from the certification.' 4 6 And although certification
gives rise to a stigma, it surely does not exceed the stigma posed by an indictment
under an organized-crime statute. 47 Accordingly, the suspicion that the defendant
in § 3503 is engaged in organized crime need not "be treated as a 'fact necessary
to constitute the crime' within the meaning of . . . In re Winship.9'1
4
8
For similar reasons, § 3503 does not infringe on prosecutorial discretion.
Because the statute does not describe a crime, there is no real prosecutorial
discretion to limit. Congress unquestionably has the power to promulgate rules
and statutes to regulate procedure and admissibility of evidence in the federal
courts. 149 Certainly the executive branch does not have the discretion to use
depositions in criminal cases when Congress forbids it.15°
In sum, § 3503 illustrates a permissive use of certification outside the
substantive criminal law. In contrast to § 2331, it does not define a crime at all,
and so need not adhere to the safeguards provided by Winship or the separation-
of-powers cases.
C. FEDERAL RuLE OF CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 42
Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) allows a federal district judge to punish contempt
of court "summarily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony the deponent as a witness. If only part
of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to
offer all of it which is relevant to the part offered and any party may offer other parts.
(g) Objections to receiving in evidence a deposition or part thereof may be made as
provided in civil actions.
145. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (RICO).
146. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). If the Justice Department indicted someone in a case without
even a hint of organized crime, and then certified that it did suspect him of engaging in organized
crime under § 3503, the district judge would surely not grant the order for the deposition.
This highlights another difference between § 2331 and § 3503; in the former, the prosecutorial
certification is subject only to limited judicial review; in the latter, prosecutorial certification is only
one ingredient in the equation which allows a district judge the discretion to decide whether or not
to grant an order authorizing a deposition.
148. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
149. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989) ("Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts . (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (footnote omitted))).
150. Id.
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constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of
the court."'' On its face, Rule 42(a) might appear utterly to flout due process;
its certification clause not only allows a summary determination of one element
of the crime of contempt, 5 2 it allows summary determination of the entire crime.
However, despite the fact that criminal contempt proceedings deserve "the
[same] protections normally provided in criminal proceedings,"'5 3 the Supreme
Court has upheld Rule 42(a)1 14 because it allows certification by a judge rather
than a prosecutor." The distinction between a judge and a prosecutor makes
perfect sense. Judges serve as neutral fact-finders, while prosecutors do not.
Despite the language quoted at the beginning of this paper, 56 our adversary
system does not permit prosecutors to exercise the kind of detached neutrality
required by the Constitution.'5 ' They cannot serve both as accusers and as fact-
finders.
On the other hand, our system expects and depends on judicial neutrality.
58
In this respect, criminal contempt actions are the same as other actions: "the
court is not a party. There is nothing that affects the judges in their own persons.
Their concern is only that the law should be obeyed and enforced, and their
151. FED. R. CRim. P. 42(a). The rule reads as follows:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge
certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite
the facts and shall be signed by, the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in
subsection (a) of this rule shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable
time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting
the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally
by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant, or on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by
an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by
jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. The defendant is entitled to
bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism
of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with
the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an
order fixing the punishment.
152. The Court has recently stated: "we have come to regard criminal contempt as 'a crime in
the ordinary sense,' . . . to rebut earlier characterizations of such actions as undeserving of the
protections normally provided in criminal proceedings." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et
Fils, S.A., 481 U.S 787, 799-800 (1987) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); other
citations omitted).
153. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
154. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 317 ("Our conclusion that summary contempt
is available . . . is supported by the fact that Rule 42 has consistently been recognized to be no more
than a restatement of the law existing when the Rule was adopted." (citations omitted)); id. at 321-
22 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("So long as this Court holds, as it does, that the summary
procedure of Rule 42(a) satisfies the requirements of due process, the Rule should be read to mean
precisely what it says."); id. at n.10; id. at 319; Note of Advisory Committee on Rules to FED. R.
CRsas. P. 42(a).
155. Cf. Vuitton Et Fils, 481 U.S. at 799 n.9.
156. See supra text accompanying note 1.
157. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
158. See, e.g., id. ("The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal in both civil and criminal cases .... The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that
life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of
the facts or the law.").
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interest is no other than that they represent in every case."'' 9 Judicial certification
of contestable issues can accord with due process even if prosecutorial certification
does not.
Of course, in certain cases, judicial certification would pose the same kinds
of problems as prosecutorial certification. If a judge received money for issuing
summary criminal contempt orders, she would no longer be neutral. Such a
situation would certainly "deprive[] a defendant . . . of due process of law
[because it would] ... subject his liberty ... to the judgment of a court the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him . ... "60 In the ordinary run of cases, however, judicial
certification accords with due process.
Further, Rule 42(a) limits itself to those cases where the judge personally
witnessed the contempt. The judge cannot certify activity outside of the court-
room, and she cannot certify states of mind or other intangible offenses. 61 In
contrast to § 2331, Rule 42(a) does not create the need to probe the intricacies
of the contemnor's thoughts to determine whether he intended to "coerce ... a
• ..population."' ' 62 The judge must "s[ee] or hear[]" the conduct.
63
Thus Rule 42(a) illustrates a third and final permissive use of certification,
and highlights two features of § 2331 which make the statute unconstitutional.
Because Rule 42 covers only those relatively minor and obvious cases of criminal
conduct committed before an observing district judge, it does not commit the
sins of § 2331. By contrast, certification in § 2331 is pernicious because it allows
certification by a prosecutor, not a judge, and because it allows certification of
a very subtle and difficult issue (one that the Justice Department doubted its
own ability to prove in open court).
Certification in Rule 42(a) also explicitly raises an issue latent in § 2331: the
right to a trial by jury.' 64 The Supreme Court has upheld summary contempt
against jury-trial challenges, 65 claiming that it "has always been ...one of the
powers necessarily incident to a court of justice - that it should have this power
of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult,
without the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it,"' 6 at least where the
punishment for the contempt does not exceed six months' imprisonment.
6 7
Summary criminal contempt appears virtually invulnerable to a jury-trial attack.
In United States v. Barnett, 61 the Court cited over fifty cases upholding summary
159. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 697 (1964) (quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S.
563, 574 (1906) (Holmes, J.)); Cf. Rose, Warden v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-79 (1986); Ward v.
City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
160. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). See Rose, 478 U.S. at 577 (1986) ("The State of
course must provide a trial before an impartial judge ...." (citations omitted)). FED. R. Cium. P.
42(b), which provides for contempt orders when the alleged contempt occurs outside the judge's
presence, holds: "[ilf the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge
is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent."
161. FED. R. CaRm. P. 42(a).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
163. FED. R. Cams. P. 42(a).
164. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
165. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964).
166. Id. at 696-97 (quoting Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890)).
167. See, e.g., Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S.
454, 475-76 (1975).
168. 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
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contempt,169 and stated: "where so many cases in both federal and state juris-
dictions by such a constellation of eminent jurists over a century and a half's
span teach us a principle which is without contradiction in our case law, we
cannot overrule it. 17o
The history pervading summary criminal contempt, however, does not extend
to § 2331. Apart from anomalies such as a court's contempt power, history
clearly supports the right to a jury.
England, from which the Western World has largely taken its concepts of
individual liberty and of the dignity and worth of every man, has bequeathed to
us safeguards for their preservation, the most priceless of which is that of trial
by jury. This right has become as much American as it was once the most English
.... In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his
life.171
Certification in § 2331 replaces a jury determination of terrorist intent just
as it replaces a judicial determination of that intent. 172 Accordingly, § 2331
probably violates the Sixth Amendment to the same extent that it violates the




This paper attempted to show that certification in § 2331 violates both the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, and, by comparing it to other examples of
certification, to explain precisely why it is unconstitutional. Part I argued that
terrorist intent is an element of the crime prohibited by § 2331, and so requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or, alternatively, that certification violates
separation-of-powers doctrine). Part II tried to show that certification in § 2331
resulted from a desire to avoid having to prove the admittedly difficult issue of
terrorist intent. It argued that as a matter of constitutional law and policy,
legislatures should not be allowed to structure their criminal statutes with the
intent to avoid Winship. Part III evoked the particular features of certification
in § 2331 which made it unconstitutional.
Beyond the implications which certification has for § 2331, however, it also
speaks more generally to the Supreme Court's burden-shifting cases. 17 Certifi-
cation should force the Court to stop avoiding the issues which surround Winship
and fashion some real criteria for distinguishing "necessary" from "unnecessary"
169. Id. at 694 & n.12.
170. Id. at 699. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 475 (1975) (noting "the historic rule that state and
federal courts have the constitutional power to punish any criminal contempt without a jury trial."
(citations omitted)).
171. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961). See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The constitutional right to a jury trial embodies 'a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968))).
172. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986).
173. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) ("In light of the foregoing [discussion
of due process], petitioners' final claim - that the Act denies them their Sixth Amendment right to
a trial by jury - merits little discussion.").
174. See id.
175. See supra note 24.
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facts.' 6 So far, the Court has assumed that its vague pronouncements would
"not lead to such abuses . . . that a new constitutional rule was required.' 77
Certification undermines that assumption, and adds new urgency to the claim
that "it is completely foreign to this Court's responsibility for constitutional
adjudication to limit the scope of judicial review because of the expectation . . .
that legislative bodies will exercise appropriate restraint. 17
Real rules are overdue. If legislative power to rewrite criminal laws has any
limits - if the legacy of Winship is to be other than "an exercise in arid
formalities' '1 79 - then the limits must be articulated. The veiled warning that
"there are limits . . . beyond which [legislatures] may not go,"' 80 in burden-
shifting amounts to no warning at all. It merely reserves in the Court some
discretion to announce limiting rules at a later date. Certification shows that the
time for such rules has come.
Certification also shows that the rule which the Court adopts should address
the legislative process as well as the legislative result. 8 1 For certification in §
2331 was pernicious just because it resulted from an effort to get around Winship,
and was detectable as such only by reference to its legislative history. The Court
must adopt a rule which governs how legislatures may attack crime through law.
The Court has several alternatives from which to chose. 8 2 (1) "[Wlhenever
the [legislature] distinguishes crimes or sentences based on an articulated factor,
that factor must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution."' 83
(2) "[I]f a [legislature] provides that a specific component of a prohibited
transaction shall give rise to both a special stigma and to a special punishment," '1
4
that component must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (3) The same test
as (2), above, plus a requirement that "in the Anglo-American legal tradition
the factor in question historically has" given rise to such a stigma and punish-
ment."
These three positions all attempt to serve as rule-like proxies for the fun-
damental policy rationale underlying Winship, "the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case [is] bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free.' 86 In society's test of criminal guilt, the Constitution
regards false positives as worse than false negatives. With this background in
mind, the Court should choose the standard which, in its view, best protects the
176. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
177. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977).
178. Id. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 209-10.
181. Cf. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 78 (proposing a substantive, Eighth-Amendment approach
to implementing Winship).
182. Cf. Allen, supra note 25, at 1148-49.
183. Id. at 1148 (footnote omitted).
184. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 226 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). A
fourth possibility, which is substantive, rather than procedural, would be a requirement of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of facts sufficient to justify penalties of the sort contemplated." Jeffries
& Stephan, supra note 78, at 1365.
186. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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innocent without overly protecting the guilty, which best ensures that "guilt shall
not escape nor innocence suffer.'
8 7
Although the differences between the three standards appear subtle, the
choice of one rather than another will make some difference. For example, Justice
Powell, the author of the dissents in Patterson v. New York, 8s and Martin v.
Ohio,18 9 voted with the majority to uphold the Pennsylvania law in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania. '9 Similarly, certification in § 2331 would surely fail test (1),
probably fail test (2), and possibly pass test (3) above.' 9'
But the main point is that the Court must pick some rule. The differences
between the rules are outweighed by the similarity which they share in contrast
to the current state of affairs: they articulate an administrable standard of judicial
review of legislative action. Lower courts, legislatures, lawyers, and society all
need a way to understand the permissible uses of burden-shifting. The Court
must give us a "conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from legitimate
legislative adjustments of the burden of persuasion in criminal cases."' 92
Of course whatever the constitutional rule adopted, legislatures will not
rewrite their criminal laws wholesale to evade the commands of Winship.,"
Certification and its ilk will likely be reserved for those special cases where the
crime in question is perceived as an especially serious threat. Yet when the
nation's ire is provoked, as it was by terrorism in 1985, legislatures, as democratic
bodies, may follow passion rather than reason. The Justices must be on guard
for such moments, and must formulate rules to protect against them.'9
187. See supra text accompanying note 1.
188. 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977). Justice Powell also wrote the majority opinion striking down the
Maine law in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
189. 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987).
190. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
191. The reason for this is that terrorist intent as defined in § 2331, like the visible possession
of a handgun in McMillan, is arguably (or at least possibly) not something that has historically given
rise to special punishment and stigma in Anglo-American law.
192. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 101-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See Jom4 H. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DisTRUST (1980) quoted in McMillan, 477 U.S. 102 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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